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In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with whom to 
interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with whom”) and the strategy 
(“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are to model the structure and strategy of 
interactions prevailing at any point in time as a directed network and to address the following open 
question in the theory of social and economic network formation: given the rules of network and 
coalition formation, the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of 
coalitions in forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics 
are likely to emerge and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of 
network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game 
possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network and coalition formation strategies), (iii) 
to show that, together with the trembles of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium 
determines an equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation, and (iv) to show 
that this endogenous process possesses a finite, nonempty set of ergodic measures, and generates a 
finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting a basin 
of attraction. We also extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics the notions of 
pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jacksonvan den Nouweland, 2005), 
and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that in order for any network-coalition pair to 
persist and be stable (pairwise, strong, or Nash) it is necessary and sufficient that the pair reside in 
one of finitely many basins of attraction. The results we obtain here for endogenous network 
dynamics and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on 
endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract games of 
network formation (Page and Wooders, 2008), and build on the seminal contributions of Jackson 
and Watts (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005). 
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In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with
whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with
whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are
to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as
a directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social
and economic network formation: given the rules of network and coalition formation,
the preferences of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in
forming networks, and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics
are likely to emergence and persist. Our main contributions are (i) to formulate
the problem of network and coalition formation as a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii)
to show that this game possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium (in network
and coalition formation strategies), (iii) to show that, together with the trembles
of nature, this stationary correlated equilibrium determines an equilibrium Markov
process of network and coalition formation, and (iv) to show that this endogenous
process possesses a ﬁnite, nonempty set of ergodic measures, and generates a ﬁnite,
disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each constituting
a basin of attraction. We also extend to the setting of endogenous Markov dynamics
the notions of pairwise stability (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strong stability (Jackson-
van den Nouweland, 2005), and Nash stability (Bala-Goyal, 2000), and we show that
in order for any network-coalition pair to persist and be stable (pairwise, strong,
or Nash) it is necessary and suﬃcient that the pair reside in one of ﬁnitely many
basins of attraction. The results we obtain here for endogenous network dynamics
and stochastic basins of attraction are the dynamic analogs of our earlier results on
endogenous network formation and strategic basins of attraction in static, abstract
games of network formation (Page and Wooders, 2008), and build on the seminal
contributions of Jackson and Watts (2002), Konishi and Ray (2003), and Dutta,
Ghosal, and Ray (2005).
KEYWORDS: endogenous network dynamics, dynamic stochastic games of net-
work formation, equilibrium Markov process of network formation, basins of attrac-
tion, Harris decomposition, ergodic probability measures, dynamic path dominance
core, dynamic pairwise stability.
JEL Classiﬁcations: A14, C71, C721I n t r o d u c t i o n
1.1 Overview
In all social and economic interactions, individuals or coalitions choose not only with
whom to interact but how to interact, and over time both the structure (the “with
whom”) and the strategy (“the how”) of interactions change. Our objectives here are
to model the structure and strategy of interactions prevailing at any point in time as a
directed network and to address the following open question in the theory of social and
economic network formation: given the rules of network formation, the preferences
of individuals over networks, the strategic behavior of coalitions in forming networks,
and the trembles of nature, what network and coalitional dynamics are likely to
emergence and persist. Thus, we propose to study the emergence of endogenous
network and coalitional dynamics from strategic behavior and the randomness in
nature.
Our main contributions are (i) to formulate the problem of network formation as
a dynamic, stochastic game, (ii) to show that this game possesses an equilibrium in
stationary correlated network and coalition formation strategies, (iii) to show that,
together with the trembles of nature, these equilibrium strategies determine an equi-
librium Markov process of network and coalition formation which respects the rules of
network formation and the preferences of individuals, and (iv) to show that, although
uncountably many networks may form, this equilibrium Markov process generates a
ﬁnite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets of networks and coalitions, each consti-
tuting a basin of attraction, and possesses a ﬁnite, nonempty set of ergodic measures.
In our prior work on static abstract games of network formation (Page and Wood-
ers, 2007, denoted PW07), we have shown that, given the rules of network formation
and the preferences of individuals, these games possess strategic basins of attraction
and these contain all networks that are likely to emerge and persist as the game un-
folds. Moreover, we have shown that when any one of these strategic basins contains
only one network, then the game possesses a network (i.e., the single network con-
tained in the singleton basin) that is stable against all coalitional network deviation
strategies - and thus the game has a nonempty path dominance core.F i n a l l y ,w eh a v e
shown in PW07 that depending on how we specialize the rules of network formation
and the dominance relation over networks, any network contained in the path domi-
nance core is pairwise stable (Jackson-Wolinsky, 1996), strongly stable (Jackson-van
den Nouweland, 2005), Nash (Bala-Goyal, 200), or consistent (Chwe, 1994).
We show here that there are many parallels between the static abstract game
formulation and our prior results for static games and the results we obtain here for
our Markov dynamic game formulation. This is suggested already by the seminal
paper by Jackson and Watts (2002) on the evolution of networks. Jackson and Watts
present a basic theory (and to our knowledge the ﬁrst theory) of stochastic dynamic
network formation over a ﬁnite set of linking networks governed by a Markov chain
generated by the myopic strategic behavior of players (following the Jackson-Wolinsky
rules of network formation) and the trembles of nature. Their model builds on the
earlier, nonstochastic model of dynamic network formation due to Watts (2001) - as
1far as we know, the ﬁrst models of network dynamics (see also Skyrms and Pemantle
(2000)). By considering a sequence of perturbed irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chains (i.e., each with a unique invariant measure) converging to the original Markov
chain, they show that any pairwise stable network is necessarily contained in the
support of an invariant measure - that is, in the support of a probability measure
that places all its support on sets of networks likely to form in the long run. We
show here that similar conclusions can be reached for directed networks with many
arc types governed by arbitrary network formation rules.
In a general Markov game setting, with farsighted players, what precisely does
it mean for a network to be pairwise stable - or stable in any sense? For example,
if the state space of networks is large, then the endogenous Markov process of net-
work formation is likely to have many invariant measures - and in fact many ergodic
probability measures (i.e., measures that place all their probability mass on a single
absorbing set). Which absorbing set contains networks stable in the sense of pairwise
stability, or strong stability, or Nash stability? These are some of the questions we
answer here in our study of endogenous network dynamics.
We conjecture that in any reasonable dynamic, stochastic model of network forma-
tion the endogenously determined Markov process of network and coalition formation
will possess ergodic probability measures and generate basins of attraction. We show
here that in fact the endogenous Markov process possesses only ﬁnitely many ergodic
measures and basins of attraction. This endogenous ﬁniteness property of equilib-
rium has serious implications for empirical work on networks. In particular, since
nature does not aﬀord the empirical observer multiple observations across states but
rather only multiple observations across time, the fact that only ﬁn i t e l ym a n yl o n g
run equilibrium sets are possible and more importantly, the fact that on these sets
(i.e., on these basins of attraction) state averages are equal to time averages gives
meaning and signiﬁcance to time series observations which seek to infer the long run
equilibrium network. Moreover, to the extent that networks can truly represent vari-
ous social and economic interactions, our understanding of how and why the network
formation process moves toward or away from any particular basin can potentially
shed new light on the persistence or transience of many social and economic con-
ditions. For example, how and why does a particular path of entrepreneurial and
scientiﬁc interactions carry an economy beyond a tipping point and onto a path of
economic growth driven by a particular industry - and why might it fail to do so?
How and why does a particular path of product line-nonlinear pricing schedule con-
ﬁgurations lead a strategically competitive industry to become more concentrated -
or fade? These are some of the applied questions which hopefully can be addressed
using a model of endogenous network dynamics
1.2 Endogenous Network Dynamics
Our approach to endogenous dynamics is mot i v a t e db yt h eo b s e r v a t i o nt h a tt h es t o -
chastic process governing network and coalition formation through time is determined
not only by nature’s randomness (or nature’s trembles) through time - as envisioned
in random graph theoretic approaches - but also by the strategic behavior of individu-
2als and coalitions through time in attempting to inﬂuence the networks and coalitions
that emerge under the prevailing rules of network formation and the trembles of na-
ture. Thus, here we will develop a theory of endogenous network and coalitional
dynamics that brings together elements of random graph theory and game theory
in a dynamic stochastic game model of network and coalition formation. While dy-
namic stochastic games have been used elsewhere in economics (see, for example,
Amir (1991, 1996), Amir and Lambson (2003), and Chakrabarti (1999, 2008), Duﬃe,
Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994), Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987,
1991), Nowak (2003, 2007)), their application to the analysis of the evolution of social
and economic networks is relatively new.
Our plan of analysis has two parts. In part (1) we will construct our dynamic game
m o d e lo fn e t w o r kand coalition formation, and then show that this game has an equi-
librium in stationary correlated stationary strategies. Our model has six primitives
consisting of the following: (i) a feasible set of directed networks representing all pos-
sible conﬁgurations of social or economic interactions, (ii) a feasible set of coalitions
allowed to form under the rules of network formation for the purpose of proposing
alternative networks, (iii) a state space consisting of feasible network-coalition pairs,
(iv) a set of players and player constraint correspondences specifying for each player
and in each state the set of feasible alternative networks and coalitions that a player
can propose under the rules of network formation as a member of the current or sta-
tus quo coalition - and as a nonmember, (v) a set of player discount rates and payoﬀ
functions deﬁned on the graph of players’ product constraint correspondence, and (vi)
a stochastic law of motion. This stochastic law of motion represents nature and spec-
iﬁes the probability with which each possible new status quo network-coalition (i.e.,
new state) might emerge as a function of the status quo network-coalition pair (i.e.,
the current state) and the proﬁle of player-proposed new status quo network-coalition
pairs (i.e., the current action proﬁle). Using these primitives, we will construct a dis-
counted stochastic game model of network formation, and then show that this game
possesses a stationary correlated equilibrium in network-coalition proposal strategies.
Finally, in part (1) we will show that, together with the stochastic law of motion,
these stationary correlated equilibrium strategies determine an equilibrium Markov
process of network and coalition formation. More importantly, we will be able to con-
clude via classical results due to Blackwell (1965) (also, Himmelberg, Parthasarathy,
and vanVleck (1976)), Nowak and Raghavan (1992), and Duﬃe, Geanakoplos, Mas-
Colell, and McLennan (1994)) that these stationary correlated equilibrium strategies
are optimal against player defections to any other history-dependent network-coalition
proposal strategies - thus showing that our decision to focus on stationary correlated
strategies is well-founded.
In part (2), we will analyze the stability properties the endogenous Markov process
of network and coalition formation. In particular, using methods of stability analysis
essentially due to Nummelin (1984) and Meyn and Tweedie (1993) - and based on the
profound work of Doeblin (1937, 1940) - we will show that the equilibrium Markov
process of network and coalition formation possesses ergodic probability measures
and generates basins of attraction. We will then study in some detail the number
3and structure of these basins of attraction as well as the structure of set of invariant
probability measures. More importantly, we will show that the equilibrium process
possesses only ﬁnitely many ergodic measures and basins of attraction. Finally, in
part (2), we will extend the deﬁnitions of pairwise stable, strongly stable, Nash, and
consistent networks to the dynamic Markov setting of the model and show that these
various types of stable networks can persist only in the basins of attraction generated
under the appropriate speciﬁcation of the rules of network formation and feasible
coalitions.
1.3 Related Literature
To our knowledge, the ﬁrst paper to study endogenous dynamics in a related model is
the paper by Konishi and Ray (2003) on dynamic coalition formation. The primitives
of their model consist of (i) a ﬁnite set of outcomes (possibly a ﬁnite set of networks),
(ii) a set of coalitional constraint correspondences specifying for each coalition and
each status quo outcome, the set of new outcomes a coalition might bring about if
allowed to do so, and (iii) a discount rate and set of player payoﬀ functions deﬁned
on the set of all outcomes. Konishi and Ray show that their model possesses an equi-
librium process of coalition formation, that is, a stochastic law of motion governing
movement from one outcome to another such that (a) if a move from one outcome
to another takes place with positive probability, then for some coalition this move
makes sense in that no coalition member is made worse oﬀ by the move and no further
move makes all coalition members better oﬀ, and (b) if for a given outcome there
is another outcome making all members of some coalition better oﬀ and no further
outcome makes this coalition even better oﬀ, then a move to another outcome takes
place with probability 1 (i.e., the probability of standing still at the given outcome
is zero). The notion of a player being better oﬀ is reckoned in terms of a player’s
valuation function implied by the maximization of the expected discounted stream of
payoﬀs with respect to the stochastic law of motion. Stated loosely, then, Konishi and
Ray show that for their model there is a law of motion which generates coalitionally
Pareto improving moves from one outcome to another (i.e., in our case it would be
from one network to another).
Our model diﬀers from the model of Konishi and Ray in several respects. First, in
our model movements from one network (outcome) to another are largely determined
by the strategic behavior of individuals within feasible coalitions. In Konishi and
Ray, coalitions are passive and strategic behavior plays no part in determining the
movement from one outcome to another. They simply show that there model is
consistent with there being a law of motion which moves the outcome along in a
coalitionally Pareto improving way. In this sense - i.e., in the sense that movement is
nonstrategic - their model is more closely related to random graph theoretic models
of network dynamics. In our model, equilibrium strategic behavior, together with
natures trembles, are central to determining equilibrium network dynamics.
Second, whereas Konishi and Ray, for technical reasons, restrict attention to a
ﬁnite set of outcomes (in our model, a ﬁnite set of networks), we allow for uncount-
ably many networks - this to allow for consideration of networks with a large number
4of nodes or networks with uncountably many arc types. This generalization is more
than a technical nicety. In order to capture the myriad and potentially complex
nature of interactions between players (say for example in a stock market or in a
contracting game with multiple principals and multiple agents) we must allow there
to be uncountably many possible types of interactions. In our model the set of po-
tential interactions are represented by a set of arc types with each arc type (or arc
label) representing a particular type of interaction (or connection) between nodes in
a directed network. Thus, because we allow for uncountably many arc types in de-
scribing the possibly ﬁnite number of interactions between nodes, in our model there
are uncountably many possible networks (or outcomes in the language of Konishi
and Ray). Moreover, in order to model large networks (i.e., networks with many
nodes), in our model we can allow there to be inﬁnitely many nodes - although here
we focus exclusively on the ﬁnite nodes case. Third, while Konishi and Ray restrict
attention at the outset to Markov laws of motion, we will show that our strategi-
cally determined equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation is
robust against all possible alternative dynamics induced by history-dependent types
of strategic behavior. Thus, at least for the class of Konishi-Ray types of models, we
will show that Markov laws of motion are stable and robust with respect to other
forms of history-dependent laws of motion.1
Finally, whereas Konishi and Ray focus on the existence of an equilibrium process
of coalition formation, here we will not only establish the existence of a strategically
determined equilibrium process of network and coalition formation, but also we will
show that this process possesses a nonempty set of ergodic measures and generates
basins of attraction.
Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005) extend the Konishi-Ray type model to consider a
particular form of strategic behavior (i.e., strategic behavior governed by a particular
set of network formation rules) in a dynamic game of network formation over a ﬁnite
set of undirected linking networks (rather than directed networks). They show that
their model has a Nash equilibrium and identify conditions under which eﬃciency can
be sustained in equilibrium - thus, continuing in a dynamic setting the seminal work
of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) on equilibrium
and eﬃciency. Here our focus is on equilibrium and stability rather than equilibrium
and eﬃciency and our analysis is carried out in a dynamic, stochastic game model
of network and coalition formation, admitting all forms of network formation rules,
over an uncountable set of directed networks. While Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray restrict
attention to Markov strategies and show that there is an equilibrium in this class
of network formation strategies, here, we show that there is an equilibrium in the
class of all stationary correlated network and coalition proposal strategies and that
this type of equilibrium is optimal relative to the class of all history-dependent net-
work formation strategies. Moreover, as mentioned above, we show that in general,
the resulting equilibrium Markov network and coalitional dynamics possess ergodic
1By a Markov law of motion we mean a stochastic law of motion where probabilistic movements
from one outcome or network to another depend only on the current outcome rather than on some
history of outcomes.
5measures and generate network and coalitional basin of attraction.
We view the starting point of our research to be the pioneering work of Jackson
and Watts (2002) already discussed brieﬂy above. Our model of endogenous net-
work and coalitional dynamics extends their work on stochastic network dynamics
in several respects. First, in our model players behave farsightedly in attempting
to inﬂuence the path of network and coalition formation - farsighted in the sense of
dynamic programing (e.g., Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005))2. Moreover, in our model
the game is played over a (possibly) uncountable collection of directed networks un-
der general rules of network formation which include not only the Jackson-Wolinsky
rules, but also other more complex rules. In our model the law of motion is such
that the trembles of nature are Markovian rather than i.i.d. as in Jackson and Watt,
and are functions of the current state and the current proﬁle of network and coali-
tion proposals by players. Extending the notion of pairwise stability to a dynamic
setting, one of the benchmarks for our research is to show that in a Markov model
of network and coalition formation, if a network is dynamically pairwise stable, then
in order to persist, it must be contained in one of ﬁnitely many basins of attraction,
and therefore, contained in the support of an ergodic probability measure.
2See Chwe (1994), Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2005), and Page and Wooders (2005) for notions
of farsighted behavior in static, abstract games.
62P r i m i t i v e s
2.1 The Space of Directed Networks
W eb e g i nb yg i v i n gt h ef o r m a ld e ﬁnition of a directed network. Let N be a ﬁnite
set of nodes with typical element denoted by i and let A be a compact metric space
of arcs with typical element denoted by a.D e n o t e b y dA the metric on A and by
dN the discrete metric on N.3 Arcs represent potential connections between nodes,
and depending on the application, nodes can represent economic agents or economic
objects such as markets or ﬁrms.
Deﬁnition 1 (Directed Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, ad i r e c t e dn e t w o r k ,G, is a nonempty, closed
subset of A × (N × N). The collection of all directed networks is denoted by
Pf(A × (N × N)).
A directed network G ∈ Pf(A×(N ×N)) thus consists of a closed set of ordered
pairs of the form (a,(i,i
 
)) where a is an arc type or an arc label and (i,i ) is an
ordered pair of nodes. We shall refer to any pair (a,(i,i
 
)) ∈ G as a connection in
network G.T h u s , a n e t w o r k G is a closed set of connections specifying how the
nodes in N are connected by the arcs in A. In a directed network order matters. In
particular, (a,(i,i
 
)) ∈ G means that nodes i and i  are connected by a type a arc
from node i to node i
 
.
Note that under our deﬁnition of a directed network, loops are allowed - that is,
we allow an arc to go from a given node back to that given node.4 Finally, note
that under our deﬁnition an arc can be used multiple times in a given network and
multiple arcs can go from one node to another. However, our deﬁnition does not
allow an arc a to go from an o d ei to an o d ei  multiple times.
The following notation is useful in describing networks. Given directed network












a ∈ A :( a,(i,i
 






a ∈ A :( a,(i,i
 
)) ∈ G for some i ∈ N
 
.
Thus, in network G,




1 if i  = i
 
0 otherwise.
4By allowing loops we are able to represent a network having no connections between distinct
n o d e sa san e t w o r kc o n s i s t i n ge n t i r e l yo fl o o p sa te a c hn o d e .
7G(a) is the set of node pairs connected by arc a,
G+(i) is the set of arcs leaving node i,a n d
G−(i ) is the set of arcs entering node i .
If for some arc a ∈ A, G(a) is empty, then arc a i sn o tu s e di nn e t w o r kG.A l s o ,
if for some node i ∈ N, G+(i) ∪ G−(i) is empty, then node i is said to be isolated.
Because A×(N×N) is a compact metric space, the set of networks Pf(A×(N×N))
equipped with the Hausdorﬀ metric h is a compact metric space (see Aliprantis
and Border (1999), sections 3.14-3.16). Formally, the Hausdorﬀ metric is deﬁned as
follows: First, let the distance between connection (a,(i0,i 1)) ∈ A × (N × N) and
network G ∈ Pf(A × (N × N)) be given by


















:= dA(a,a )+dN(i0,i  
0)+dN(i1,i  
1)
is the metric on A×(N ×N). Given this distance measure between connections and




sup(a,(i0,i1))∈G d((a,(i0,i 1)),G  ),sup(a ,(i 
0,i 





for G and G  in Pf(A × (N × N)).5
Given the nature of the discrete metric on the set of nodes, it is easy to see that
if the Hausdorﬀ distance between networks G and G  is less than ε ∈ (0,1),t h a ti s ,
if networks G and G  are within ε distance for ε < 1, then the same set of nodes
are involved in connections in both networks and the networks diﬀer only in the way
these nodes are connected (i.e., in the types of arcs used in making the connections).
Thus if h(G,G ) < ε < 1,t h e n
(a,(i,i )) ∈ G i fa n do n l yi f(a ,(i,i )) ∈ G 
for arcs a and a  with dA(a,a ) < ε.
Convergence in the space of directed networks (Pf(A×(N×N)),h) can be charac-
terized via the notions of limit inferior and limit superior. Let {Gn}n be a sequence of
directed networks. The limit inferior of this sequence, denoted by Li(Gn),i sd e ﬁned
as follows: connection (a,(i,i )) ∈ Li(Gn) if and only if there is a sequence of connec-
tions {(an,(in,i  n))}n converging to (a,(i,i )) (i.e., (an,(in,i  n))
d → (a,(i,i )))w h e r e
for each n connection (an,(in,i  n)) i sc o n t a i n e di nn e t w o r kGn. The limit superior,
denoted by Ls(Gn),i sd e ﬁned as follows: connection (a,(i,i )) ∈ Ls(Gn) if and only
if there is a subsequence of connections {(ank,(ink,i  nk))}k converging to (a,(i,i ))
5It is important to note that because A × (N × N) is compact, all metrics compatible with the
product topology on A×(N ×N), generate the same Hausdorﬀ metric topology on Pf(A×(N ×N))
(see Theorem 3.77 in Aliprantis and Border (1999)).
8(i.e.,(ank,(ink,i  nk))
d → (a,(i,i )))w h e r ef o re a c hk connection (ank,(ink,i  nk)) is con-
tained in network Gnk. A directed network G ∈ Pf(A × (N × N)) is said to be the
limit of networks {Gn}n if Ls(Gn)=G = Li(Gn).M o r e o v e r ,b e c a u s eA × (N × N)
is a compact metric space, Ls(Gn)=G = Li(Gn) if and only if h(Gn,G) → 0 (i.e.,
the sequence of networks {Gn}n converges to network G ∈ Pf(A × (N × N)) under
the Hausdorﬀ metric h - see Theorem 3.93 in Aliprantis and Border (1999)).6
In formulating our game of network and coalition formation, it will often be useful
to restrict attention to a particular feasible subset of networks.
Deﬁnition 2 (Feasible Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, a feasible set of networks is a nonempty, h-closed
subset G of the collection of all directed networks Pf(A × (N × N)).
Example (A feasible set of networks): Suppose that the feasible set of networks
G is given by
G =
 
G ∈ Pf(A × (N × N)) :
   G+(i)
    ≤ c(i)
 
,
where c(·) is a nonnegative integer-valued function and |G+(i)| denotes the cardinality
of the set of arcs G+(i) emanating from node i (i.e., the out degree of node i). Thus,
in each network G contained in G there is at most c(i) arcs emanating from node i.
It is easy to show that G is an h-closed subset of Pf(A × (N × N)).
2.2 Players and Coalitions
We will make a distinction between the set of players (or decision makers) and the
set of nodes. In particular, we will not assume that the set of players and the set
of nodes are necessarily one and the same. For example, some nodes may be club
locations while other nodes may be players who choose clubs.
Because changing one network to another network very often involves groups of
players acting in concert, coalitions will play a central role in our model. Let D
denote the set of players (a set not necessarily equal to N the set of nodes) with
typical element denoted by d and let P(D) denote the collection of all coalitions (i.e.,
nonempty subsets of D) with typical element denoted by S. We will assume that the
set of players D has cardinality m (i.e., |D| = m). Depending on the rules of network




n) are networks, that is, both Li(G
n) and Ls(G
n) are contained in




9Deﬁnition 3 (Feasible Coalitions)
Given player set D, a feasible set of coalitions is a nonempty subset F of the
collection of all coalitions P(D).
Examples (Feasible sets of coalitions):
(1) Suppose that the feasible set of coalitions is given
F2 = {S ∈ P(D):|S| ≤ 2}.
Thus, all feasible coalitions consi s to fa tm o s tt w op l a y e r s .T h es e tF2 is, for example,
the feasible set for the Jackson-Wolinsky rules. If the set of nodes and the set of
players are one in the same, then under the Jackson-Wolinsky rules, a connection can
be removed from a network if and only if one or both players involved in the connection
agree to remove the connection (arc subtraction is unilateral), and a connection can
be added to a network if and only if both players involved in the connection agree to
add the connection (arc addition is bilateral).
(2) Suppose that the feasible set of coalitions is given
F1 = {S ∈ P(D):|S| =1 }.
Thus, all feasible coalitions consist of one player. The set F1 is, for example, the
feasible set for the noncooperative, Bala-Goyal rules (Bala-Goyal (2000)). If the set
of nodes and the set of players are one in the same, then under the Bala-Goyal rules,
a connection can be added or removed from a network if and only if the initiating
player in the connection agrees to add or remove the connection (arc addition and
subtraction is unilateral).7
2.3 States, Actions, and Payoﬀs
We shall take as the state space the set Ω := (G×F) of all feasible network-coalition
pairs. Each state in (G×F) has the following interpretation: if (G,S) is the current
state, then G is the current status quo network of social interactions and it is coalition
S’s turn to propose a new state - that is, to propose a new status quo network and
a new coalition to propose the next network.
Equipping F with the discrete metric dF (i.e., dF(S ,S)=0if S  = S, dF(S ,S)=
1 if S   = S), the state space (G×F) is a compact metric space under the metric dΩ
given by
dΩ((G ,S ),(G,S)) := h(G ,G)+dF(S ,S).
Letting B(Ω): =B(G×F) be the Borel σ-ﬁeld generated by the metric dΩ,w ee q u i p
our state space (G×F,B(G ×F)) with a probability measure
μ = ν × γ
7Let (a,(i,i
 )) be a connection in network G where the set of nodes is equal to the set of players.
In the connection (a,(i,i
 )),p l a y e ri is the initiating player.
10where the probability measure γ on coalitions is such that γ(S) > 0 for all S ∈ F
and where the probability measure ν on networks is such that the countable set of
networks constituting the set of all atoms of the dominating probability measure ν
is given by
Aν = {Gα1,G α2,...} = {Gαk}
∞
k=1 ⊂ G.( 1 )
For all Gαk ∈ Aν, ν({Gαk}) > 0 and for all networks G ∈ G\Aν, ν({G})=0
(Parthasarathy (1967)). Thus, we have as our state space, the probability space
(Ω,B(Ω),μ)=( G×F,B(G ×F),ν × γ), (2)
a compact metric space with metric dΩ = h + dF. Because G is a compact metric
space, B(G×F)= B(G) × B(F) where B(F) is the set of all subsets of F (including
the empty set).
In our game each player’s action takes the form of a recommendation or proposal.
In particular, given current state (G,S) ∈ Ω,e a c hp l a y e rd ∈ D has available a non-
empty, dΩ-closed set of actions Φd(G,S) ⊆ G×F - that is, a closed set of proposals.
We will assume that
Φd(G,S)=Γd(G,S) × Λd(G,S),
where for each state (G,S), Γd(G,S) ⊆ G is a h-closed subset of network proposals
and Λd(G,S) ⊆ F is a subset of coalition proposals.
Thus, for each player d the mapping Φd(·) speciﬁes, for any current state (G,S),
the set of network-coalition proposals available to player d, and thus the collection of
constraint mappings
{Φd(·):d ∈ D}
speciﬁes the rules of network formation by specifying for each player d, in each state
of the game (G,S), the possible moves that player d can make. With this in mind,
we will assume that
A-1 (continuity of the constraint mappings)
for each player d ∈ D, the correspondence Φd(·) is such that
(i) for each state (G,S) ∈ (G×F),
(a) (G,S) ∈ Φd(G,S) for all d ∈ D,
and











:( G ,S ) ∈ Φd(G,S)
 
. (4)
11Thus, under A-1(i)(a) each player d in each state (G,S) has the option of propos-
ing that the status quo network-coalition pair be maintained, and under A-1(i)(b) if
the player is not part of the coalition whose turn it is to move, then the status quo is
the only network proposal available to that player. Notice however (see A-1(i)(b)),
that even if a player is not part of the coalition whose turn it is to move, then that
player can propose that another coalition, other than the status quo coalition S,b e
chosen to propose the next network.
Assumption A-1(ii) implies that the correspondence
(G,S) → Φ(G,S): =Πd∈DΦd(G,S), (5)
has a closed graph.
In order for players to decide which states to propose, we must specify the payoﬀ
functions. We shall assume that
A-2 (measurability and continuity of payoﬀs)
each player d ∈ D has a payoﬀ function
rd(·,·):( G×F)×(G×F)
m → [−M,M] (6)
such that
(i) for each state (G,S) ∈ (G×F), rS((G,S),·) is continuous on (G×F)
m, and
(ii) for each m-tuple of proposals
(GD,S D)=( Gd,S d)d∈D ∈ (G×F)
m,
rd(·,(GD,S D)) is B(G×F)-measurable.
Thus, if the current state is (G,S) (i.e., if the status quo network is G and it is
coalition S’s turn to move) and if players propose m-tuple of networks-coalition pairs
(GD,S D) ∈ Φ(G,S),
then player d
 
s payoﬀ is given by
rd((G,S),(GD,S D)) := rd((G,S),(Gd,S d,G −d,S −d)).
2.4 The Law of Motion
Given the proﬁle of player proposals (GD,S D) and given the current state, (G,S) ∈
(G×F), nature then chooses the next state (i.e., the next network-coalition pair)
according to probabilistic transition law, q(·|(G,S),(GD,S D)) deﬁn e do nt h es t a t e
space (G×F,B(G×F)). We will assume the following concerning the law of motion:
12A-3 (measurability, continuity, and domination of the law of motion)
(i) for all E ∈ B(G ×F), the function
((G,S),(GD,S D)) → q(E|(G,S),(GD,S D))
is measurable over the graph of Φ(·);
(ii) for all dΩ-closed F ∈ B(G ×F), the function
(GD,S D) → q(F|(G,S),(GD,S D))
is continuous on Φ(G,S) for all (G,S) ∈ (G×F);a n d
(iii) for all ((G,S),(GD,S D)) contained in the graph of Φ(·) the measure
q(·|(G,S),(GDSD))
is absolutely continuous with respect the probability measure μ = ν × γ de-
ﬁned on (Ω,B(Ω)) = (G×F,B(G ×F)) (i.e., q(·|(G,S),(GD,S D))   μ for all
((G,S),(GD,S D)) ∈ GrΦ(·)).
Remarks 1: In order to save writing and spare the reader, when no confusion is
possible, we will use the notation
(Ω,B(Ω)) = (G×F,B(G ×F))
for our state space and the notation ω for elements (G,S) of the state space.
It should be noted that (A.3)(ii) is stronger than the usual weak continuity as-




D) → (ωD) ∈ Φ(ω),
and any dΩ-closed F ∈ B(Ω),
limsupn q(F|ω,(ωn
D)) ≤ q(F|ω,(ωD))
or equivalently,  
Ω f(ω )q(dω |ω,(ωn
D)) →
 
Ω f(ω )q(dω |ω,(ωD)),
for any bounded, continuous function f(·). Under (A.3)(ii), however, we have strength-
ened weak continuity so that for any sequence {ωn
D}n in Φ(ω) with
ωn
D → ωD ∈ Φ(ω),
and any h-closed F ∈ B(Ω),
limn q(F|ω,ωn
D)=q(F|ω,ωD)
or equivalently (by Delbaen’s Lemma (1974)),
 
Ω v(ω )q(dω |ω,ωn
D) →
 
Ω v(ω )q(dω |ω,ωD),
for any bounded, measurable function v(·).
132.5 Plans and Stationary Correlated Strategies
2.5.1 Plans
A plan πd =( π1
d,π2
d,...) for player d ∈ D is a sequence of history dependent condi-
tional probability measures on (Ω,B(Ω)). Under plan πd in period n given the history
of states and action m−tuples (i.e., the (n−1)-sequence of network-coalition pairs and








and given the current (period n)s t a t eωn =( Gn,Sn),p l a y e rd chooses a network-
coalition proposal according to the conditional probability measure
πn
d(·|Hn−1,ωn) ∈ P (Φd(ωn)). (7)
Here, P (Φd(ωn)) is the set of all probability measures with support contained in
Φd(ωn).8 Let Hn−1 denote set of all (n − 1)-histories and let
Πn
d := ΠΦd(Hn−1 × Ω,P(Ω))
denote the set of all measurable functions, (Hn−1,ωn) → πn
d(·|Hn−1,ωn) ∈ P(Ω)
such that πn
d(·|Hn−1,ωn) ∈ P (Φd(ωn)) for all ωn ∈ Ω. Formally, the set of plans for







A Markov plan ψd =( ψ1
d,ψ2
d,...) for player d ∈ D is a sequence of state-dependent
conditional probability measures on (Ω,B(Ω)). Under Markov plan ψd in period
n given the current (period n) status quo network-coalition pair (or state) ωn =
(Gn,Sn),p l a y e rd chooses a network proposal according to the conditional probability
measure
ψn
d(·|ωn) ∈ P (Φd(ωn)). (8)
Let
Σn
d := ΣΦd(Ω,P(Ω)) := ΣΦd
denote the set of all measurable functions, ω → ψn
d(·|ω) ∈ P(Ω) such that ψn
d(·|ωn) ∈







A stationary Markov plan (σd,σd,...) for player d ∈ D -o ra sw es h a l lc a l l
it here - a stationary strategy for player d ∈ D - is a constant sequence of state-
dependent conditional probability measures on (Ω,B(Ω)). Under stationary strategy
(σS,σS,...) given the current (period n) status quo network-coalition pair (or state)
ωn =( Gn,Sn),p l a y e rd,i ne a c ha n de v e r yp e r i o dn, chooses a network proposal
according to the conditional probability measure
σd(·|ωn) ∈ P (Φd(ωn)). (9)
Rather than write σd(·|ω) we will sometimes write σd(ω).
8For any set E⊆ G×F we shall denote by P (E) the set of all probability measures with support
contained in E.
142.5.2 Stationary Correlated Strategies
A stationary correlated strategy consists of m +1functions, λi(·):Ω → [0,1] such
that
 m
i=0 λi(ω)=1and m +1measurable functions
σi
D(·):Ω→ P(Ω) ×···×P(Ω)
      
|D| times
such that for each i =0 ,1,...,m and each state ω ∈ Ω, σi
D(ω)=( σi
d(·|ω))d∈D ∈
Πd∈DP (Φd(ω)).T h u s f o r e a c h i =0 ,1,...,m, σi
D(·) is an m-tuple of stationary
strategies (recall that |D| = m)w h e r ee a c hσi




−d(·|·)), if the current state is ω ∈ Ω then each
player d chooses his network-coalition proposal (i.e., chooses his action) according to
the probability measure σi
d(·|ω) ∈ P (Φd(ω)).
Under stationary correlated strategy (λi(·),(σi
d(·|·)))m
i=0, if the current state is
ω ∈ Ω then the ith m-tuple σi
D(·) of stationary strategies (one for each player) is






d(·|ω) ∈ P (Φd(ω)).
Thus, for each player d, σλ





d(·|·), if the current state is ω ∈ Ω then player d will choose his
network-coalition proposal according to probability measure
σλ
d(·|ω) ∈ P (Φd(ω)).
Note that if ω =( G,S) and d/ ∈ S,t h e na n ym e a s u r eσd(·|ω) in P (Φd(ω)) is such
that
σd({G}×F|G,S     
ω
)=1 .
Thus, in any state ω =( G,S),i fp l a y e rd is not a member of the active coalition S,







places probability 1 on the set of all proposals (G ,S ) that include the status quo
network G and zero probability on all others.
2.6 Player Payoﬀs
Given stationary correlated strategy (λi(·),(σi
d(·|·)))m
i=0, if the current state is ω ∈ Ω









D(·|ω) is the product measure ×dσλ
d(·|ω) with support contained
in Φ(ω): =Πd∈DΦd(ω).
If network-coalition proposal m-tuple ωD is chosen according to product measure
σλ
D(·|ω), then nature chooses the next network-coalition pair (i.e., the next state)


















D(ω)) for n ≥ 2,
denote the nth period expected payoﬀ to player d under stationary correlated strategy
σλ
D(·) starting at network-coalition pair ω =( G,S) given law of motion q(·|·,·). Here,
for n ≥ 2, qn(·|ω,σλ













The discounted expected payoﬀ to player d over an inﬁnite time horizon under sta-
tionary correlated strategy σλ
D(·) ∈
 









In general, the discounted expected payoﬀ to player d over an inﬁnite time horizon
under plan πD =( πd)d∈D ∈ Π∞ :=
 
d∈D Π∞







3 Dynamic Network and Coalition Formation Games and
Nash Equilibrium
A dynamic network and coalition formation game is given by
Γ := (Ω,E d(·)(·),Π∞
d )d∈D .
A dynamic network and coalition formation game starting at state ω ∈ Ω is given by
Γω := (Ω,E d(·)(ω),Π∞
d )d∈D .
16Deﬁnition 4 (Nash Equilibrium)
A stationary correlated strategy (λ∗i(·),(σ∗i
d (·|·))d∈D)m
i=0 with corresponding m-tuple
of stationary strategies σ∗λ
D (·)=( σ∗λ
d (·|·))d∈D is a Nash equilibrium of the
dynamic network and coalition formation game Γ if for all starting network-




−d)(ω) for all πd ∈ Π∞
d .
Thus, a stationary correlated strategy (λ∗i(·),(σ∗i
d (·|·))d∈D)m
i=0 with corresponding
m-tuple of stationary strategies σ∗λ
D (·) is a Nash equilibrium of dynamic network and
coalition formation game Γ if it is a Nash equilibrium for the game Γω for all starting
states.
Theorem 1 (The Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Stationary Correlated Network
and Coalition Formation Strategies)
Under assumptions [A-1]-[A-3] the dynamic network and coalition formation game
Γ := (Ω,E d(·)(·),Π∞
d )d∈D .
has a Nash equilibrium in stationary correlated strategies.
Our approach to proving existence essentially follows the approach introduced
by Nowak and Raghavan in their seminal 1992 paper.9 But because we assume that
players’ discount factors βd are heterogeneous, and more importantly, because our sto-
chastic continuity assumptions concerning the law of motion are weaker than those of
Nowak and Raghavan (their assumptions imply our assumptions), we include a proof
in the last section of the paper. Our proof diﬀers from that of Nowak and Raghavan
in several respects, but as in Nowak and Raghavan, the basic objectives of our proof
are to show that there exists a stationary correlated strategy (λ∗i(·),(σ∗i
d (·|·))d∈D)m
i=0
with corresponding m-tuple of stationary strategies (σ∗λ
d (·|·))d∈D and an m-tuple of
B(Ω)-measurable value functions, w∗
d(·):Ω→[−M,M], such that for each player
d ∈ D and for all states ω ∈ Ω,
w∗
d(ω)=rd(ω,σ∗λ































9The computation of stationary equil i b r i ai ns t o c h a s t i cg a m e si sad i ﬃcult and deep problem.
Recently, Herings and Peeters (2004) have introduced an algorithm (in a non-network setting) based
on a stochastic tracing procedure which provides a solution to the computational problem for the sta-
tionary case in most stochastic games. The computation of stationary, correlated equilibria remains
an open question.
174E m e r g e n t M a r k o v P r o c e s s
4.1 Equilibrium Transitions
Under stationary correlated equilibrium, σ∗λ
D (·)=( σ∗λ
d (·|·))d∈D, the emergent Markov





































0 = ω} = p∗n(E|ω)=qn(E|ω,σ∗λ
D (ω)),








p∗n−1(E|ω )p∗(dω |ω) (10)
for n =1 ,2,...,a n dp∗0(·|ω)=δω(·) is the Dirac measure at ω.
4.2 Absorbing Sets and Invariant and Ergodic Probability Measures
As e tE ∈ B(Ω) is called a p∗-absorbing set if p∗(E|ω)=1for all network-coalition
pairs ω ∈ E.A p∗-absorbing set E∈L∗ is said to be indecomposable if it does not
contain the union of two disjoint absorbing sets. Let L∗ ⊆ B(Ω) denote the collec-
tion of all p∗-absorbing sets. Note that the set of all absorbing sets is closed under
countable unions and intersections.
A probability measure λ(·) on the state space of feasible network-coalition pairs




p∗(E|ω)dλ(ω) for all E ∈ B(Ω). (11)
Thus, if probability measure λ(·) is p∗-invariant, then for any set of network-coalition
pairs E∈B(Ω), if the current status quo network-coalition pair ωn =( Gn,S n) is
10Law of motion ω → p
∗(·|ω) is a Markov transition if for each ω, p
∗(·|ω) is a probability measure
and for each E ∈ B(Ω),
p
∗(E|·):Ω→[0,1]






n) for some n.
18chosen according to probability measure λ(·) - so that the probability that ωn lies
in E is just λ(E) - then the probability that next period’s network-coalition pair
ωn+1 =( Gn+1,S n+1) lies in E is also λ(E)=
 
Ω p∗(E|ω)dλ(ω).D e n o t e b y I∗ the
collection of all p∗-invariant measure.
A p∗-invariant measure λ(·) is said to be p∗-ergodic if λ(E)=0or λ(E)=1for all
E∈L∗.D e n o t eb yE∗ the collection of all p∗-ergodic measures. Because the p∗-ergodic
probability measures are the extreme points of the (possibly empty) convex set I∗
of p∗-invariant measures (see Theorem 19.25 in Aliprantis and Border (1999)), each
measure λ(·) in I∗ can be written as a convex combination of the measures in E∗.
4.3 Recurrence, Irreducibility, and Maximal Harris Sets













while the expected number of visitations starting from network-coalition pair ω =







The hitting time of network-coalition formation process {W∗
n}n for set E∈B(Ω)
is given by
τ∗
E := inf {n ≥ 1:W∗
n ∈ E}. (14)
Following in Tweedie (2001),
L∗(ω,E): =P r{τ∗
E < ∞|W∗
0 = ω} =P r{∪∞
n=1 (W∗
n ∈ E|W∗
0 = ω)} (15)
is the probability of hitting (or reaching) in ﬁnite time the set of network-coalition
pairs E starting from network-coalition pair ω ∈ Ω given transition p∗(·|·).
Finally, the probability with which the network-coalition formation process {W∗
n}n
visits E∈B(Ω) inﬁnitely often (denoted by i.o.) is given by
Q∗(ω,E): =P r{W∗











By the Orey (1971), if for any E ∈ B(Ω),
L∗(ω,E)=1for all ω ∈ Ω,t h e nQ∗(ω,E)=1for all ω ∈ Ω. (17)
The network-coalition formation process {W∗
n}n governed by p∗(·|·) is said to be
ψ-irreducible if for some nontrivial, σ-ﬁnite measure ψ(·) on B(Ω),
ψ(E) > 0 implies L∗(ω,E) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
19Thus if the process {W∗
n}n governed by p∗(·|·) is ψ-irreducible, then it hits all the
“important” sets of network-coalition pairs (i.e., the sets E such that ψ(E) > 0)
with positive probability starting from any network-coalition pair in the state space
Ω = G ×F.
The network-coalition formation process {W∗
n}n governed by p∗(·|·) is said to be
ψ-recurrent if for some nontrivial, σ-ﬁnite measure ψ(·) on B(Ω),
ψ(E) > 0 implies Q∗(ω,E)=1for all ω ∈ Ω.
A set of network-coalition pairs H∈B(Ω) is called a Maximal Harris set if for
some nontrivial, σ-ﬁnite measure ψ(·) on B(Ω) such that ψ(H) > 0,
ψ(A) > 0 implies L∗(ω,A)=1for all ω ∈ H,
and
L∗(ω,H)=1implies that ω ∈ H.
Note that Maximal Harris sets are absorbing and indecomposable. Moreover, if
H and H  are distinct Maximal Harris sets, then they are disjoint.
A set of network-coalition pairs T∈B(Ω) is transient if T is the disjoint union
of countably many uniformly transient sets Uj, that is, sets Uj∈B(Ω) such that
T = ∪jUj and for each set there is a ﬁnite constant Mj, such that for all network-






p∗n(Uj|ω) <M j. (18)
A set of network-coalition pairs E ∈ B(Ω) is said to be p∗−inessential if
Q∗(ω,E)=0for all ω ∈ Ω. (19)
Thus, a set of states E is inessential if the probability that the network-coalition
formation process visits the set E inﬁnitely often is zero stating from any state. If a
set of states is inessential, then if the process visits the state at all, it leaves the state
for good after ﬁnitely many moves. The union of countable many inessential states is
called an improperly p∗−essential set. Any other set is called properly p∗−essential.
4.4 The Fundamental Conditions for Stability: Drift and Global
Uniform Countable Additivity
Given the Markov transition ω → p∗(·|ω) what can be said concerning stability?
Quite a bit if the Markov transition p∗(·|·) satisﬁes the following two conditions:
The Tweedie Conditions (2001):
there exists a measurable set of network-coalition pairs C ⊆ Ω, a nonnegative mea-
surable function
V (·):Ω→[0,∞],
20and a ﬁnite b such that (i) (the drift condition) for all ω ∈ Ω
 
Ω
V (ω )dp∗(ω |ω) ≤ V (ω) − 1+bIC(ω),
and (ii) (uniform countable additivity) for any sequence {Bn}n ⊂ B(Ω) decreasing





We say that the Markov transition p∗(·|·) satisﬁes global uniform countable addi-





and we will say that the Tweedie conditions are satisﬁed globally if the Tweedie
conditions hold with C = Ω.
In Section 5 below, using some beautiful results by Meyn and Tweedie (1993),
Tweedie (2001), and Costa and Dufour (2005), we will show that if the emergent
Markov transition p∗(·|·) governing the equilibrium process of network and coalition
formation is globally uniformly countable additive, then the equilibrium process pos-
sesses some striking stability properties - analogous to those demonstrated in Page
and Wooders (2007) for static abstract games of network formation.
To begin let us strengthen slightly our stochastic continuity assumption A-3(ii)
as follows:
A-3 (ii)’ for all dΩ-closed sets F ∈ B(Ω) of network-coalition pairs, the function
(ω,ωD) → q(F|ω,ωD)
is continuous over the graph of Φ(·).
Theorem 2 (Setwise Convergence on Closed Sets and Global Uniform Countable
Additivity)
Given that the state space (Ω,B(Ω)) of networks and coalitions is a compact metric
space, if the law of motion is such that q(F|·,·) is continuous on the graph
of Φ(·) for all dΩ-closed sets F of network-coalition pairs (i.e., if A-3(ii)’ is
satisﬁed), then p∗(·|·) is globally uniformly countable additive.
Proof. Let M(Ω) denote the Banach space of bounded measurable functions on
(Ω,B(Ω)), equipped with the sup norm and let rca(Ω) denote the Banach space of
ﬁnite signed Borel measures on (Ω,B(Ω)). First, observe that the set of probability
measures
ΠΦ := {q(·|ω,ωD):( ω,ωD) ∈ GrΦ(·)}
is sequentially compact in the σ(rca(Ω),M(Ω)) topology. This follows because GrΦ(·)










v(ω )q(dω |ω,ωD)) for all v(·) ∈ M(Ω).







vk(ω )q(dω |ω,ωD)=0 (21)
whenever vk(·) ↓ 0, vk(·) ∈ M(Ω).
To see that (21) implies global uniform countable additivity (20), consider a se-
quence {Bk}k ⊂ B(Ω) decreasing to ∅ (i.e., Bk ↓∅ )a n dl e tvk(·): =IBk(·),w h e r e
IBk(ω)=
 
1 if ω ∈ Bk
0 if ω / ∈ Bk.




Finally, for each k let (ωk,ωk
D) ∈ GrΦ(·) be such that
q(Bk|ωk,ωk
D)= s u p
(ω,ωD)∈GrΦ(·)
q(Bk|ω,ωD).









Remarks 2: Alternatively, global uniform countable additivity will be guaranteed if
instead of assuming A-3(ii)’, we add to our list of assumptions A-3 the following
assumption:
A-3 (iv) the densities f(·|ω,ωD) of q(·|ω,ωD) with respect to the dominating prob-
ability measure μ are integrably bounded, that is, there exists a μ-integrable function
h(·):Ω → R+
such that for all (ω,ωD) ∈ GrΦ(·),
0 ≤ f(ω |ω,ωD) ≤ h(ω ) for all ω  ∈ Ω. (22)
22With this additional assumption, we have for any sequence {Bn}n ⊂ B(Ω) de-

























Bn h(ω )dμ(ω ) → 0 as Bn ↓∅ .
Let A-3
 
denote the altered or augmented set of assumptions A-3 (i.e., either altered
by A-3 (ii)’ or augmented by A-3 (iv)).
By Theorem 2, under assumptions [A-1], [A-2], and [A-3’], the equilibrium Markov
transition p∗(·|·) governing the process of network and coalition formation is globally
uniformly countably additive. Moreover, letting C = Ω, V (ω)=1for all ω ∈ Ω,
and b =2 , the drift condition is also satisﬁed. Thus, by strengthening slightly the
stochastic continuity properties of the law of motion q(·|·,·) beyond what is required
to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium Markov transition, p∗(·|·),w ea r ea b l et o
conclude in Theorem 2 that the Tweedie conditions are satisﬁed globally (i.e., with
C = Ω).
5 Basins of Attraction, Invariance, and Ergodicity
We now have our ﬁrst result concerning stochastic basins of attraction and the sta-








Theorem 3 (Basins of Attraction: The Finite Decomposition of the State Space)








governed by the equilibrium Markov transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)) generates
a ﬁnite decomposition of the state space of network-coalition pairs Ω = G ×F
into a ﬁnite number of disjoint basins of attraction and a disjoint transient set.







where each Hi is a maximal Harris set and T is transient. Moreover,
L∗(ω,∪iHi)=1 (24)
for every network-coalition pair ω ∈ Ω.
23By Theorem 3, the emergent network-coalition formation process {W∗
n}n is such
that starting at any network-coalition pair not contained in a basin of attraction, the
process will reach some basin Hi in a ﬁnite number of moves with probability 1, and
once there will stay there with probability 1. An analogous conclusion is reached in
Page and Wooders (2007) for static, abstract games of network formation over ﬁnitely
many networks. There it is shown that no matter what rules of network formation
prevail, given any proﬁle of player preferences the feasible set of networks contains a
ﬁnite, disjoint collection of sets each set representing a strategic basin of attraction in
the sense that if the game is repeated - each time starting at the status quo network
reached in the previous play of the game - the process of network formation generated
by repeating this static game will reach a network contained in some strategic basin
and once there will stay there.
Proof. Because the Tweedie conditions hold globally under our assumptions [A-1],








where each Hi is indecomposable and Maximal Harris and T is transient. Moreover,
by Theorem 2 in Tweedie (2001), this Harris decomposition is such that
L∗(ω,∪N
i=1Hi)=1
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Theorem 4 (Invariance and Ergodicity of the Process of Network and Coalition
Formation)







be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium
Markov transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ







be the corresponding ﬁnite Harris decomposition.
The following statements are true:
(1) Corresponding to each basin of attraction Hi,t h e r ei sau n i q u ep∗-invariant
probability measure λi(·) with λi(Hi)=1 . Moreover, for each network-coalition










L∗(ω,H i)λi(E ∩ Hi), for all E ∈ B(Ω).
(25)
where p∗k(E|ω) is deﬁned recursively, see (10).




Moreover, a probability measure λ(·) on (Ω,B(Ω)) is p∗-invariant, i.e. λ(·) ∈




λ(Hi)λi(E ∩ Hi), for all E ∈ B(Ω). (26)
(3) E∗ is a singleton (i.e., E∗ = {λ(·)}) if and only if the network-coalition formation
process {W∗
n}n is ψ-irreducible, in which case for each network-coalition pair







Proof. (1) Under our assumptions [A-1], [A-2] and [A-3’] (see the proof of Theorem 2
above), p∗(·|·) satisﬁes the Tweedie conditions globally. As a result, the ﬁrst statement
in part (1) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5 in Tweedie (2001). The second
statement also follows from the Tweedie conditions holding globally and Theorem 1
in Tweedie (2001) (also, see Chapter 13 in Meyn and Tweedie (1993)).
(2) Again because the Tweedie Conditions are satisﬁed globally, the ﬁrst state-
ment in part (2) follows from Lemma 2 in Tweedie (2001), Theorem 2.18 part (1) in
Costa and Dufour (2005), Theorem 3.8 in Costa and Dufour, and the proof of Propo-
sition 5.3 in Costa and Dufour. The second statement in part (2), that λ(·) ∈ I∗
implies (26), follows from the proof of Proposition 5.3 in Costa and Dufour (2005).
T h ef a c tt h a t(26) implies λ(·) ∈ I∗ follows from observation (but also, see Theorem
19.25 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) and Theorem 2 in Villareal (2004)).
(3) Finally, because the Tweedie Conditions are satisﬁed globally, necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for E∗ to be a singleton, given in terms of ψ-irreducibility follow
from Theorem 3 in Tweedie (2001). The convergence result in part (3) follows from
the convergence result in part (1) of the Theorem and the fact that if there is only one
basin of attraction H (i.e., one maximal Harris set), then by Theorem 3, L∗(ω,H)=1
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Note that the probability measures in E∗ are orthogonal,t h a ti s ,f o ra l li and i 
in {1,2,...,N} with i  = i ,
λi(Ω\Hi)=λi
 (Hi)=0 .
5.1 Ergodic Properties of the Strategic Values
For each starting network-coalition pair ω =( G,S) ∈ Ω, w∗
d(ω) is the strategic value
to player d of following his part of the stationary correlated equilibrium strategies
σ∗λ
D (·), given that all other players follow their parts of the strategy. Because σ∗λ
D (·)
25is Nash, we know this is the best that player d can do relative to all other strategies,
even those that are history dependent. Strategies σ∗λ
D (·) together with the trembles of
nature determine the equilibrium Markov process of network and coalition formation
via the transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)). The questions we wish to address in this
section concern the properties of players’ strategic values across time and states given
the equilibrium process of network and coalition formation.







































Ω p∗(E|ω )p∗k−1(dω |ω).
Here, p∗k(E|ω) is the probability that process reaches the set of network-coalition
pairs E starting at network-coalition pair ω =( G,S) in k periods or moves.
The function p∗(n)w∗
d(·) speciﬁes for each starting network-coalition pair, player
d’s n-period time average expected strategic value (i.e., the average value of following
his part of the stationary correlated equilibrium strategies σ∗λ
D (·) for n moves).W e
can think of limn p∗(n)w∗
d(·) therefore as specifying for each starting network-coalition
pair, player d’s time average expected value.











where λω(·) ∈ I∗ for all ω ∈ Ω and {λi(·):i =1 ,2,...,N} = E∗. Because p∗(n)(·|ω)









d(ω )dλi(ω ). (28)
Thus, we obtain one of the fundamental principles of equilibrium dynamics: the
equality of time averages and state averages.
26Theorem 5 (The Equality of Time Average Values and State Average Values)








governed by the equilibrium Markov transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)) is such
that:
(1) for each player d starting at any network-coalition pair ω =( G,S) contained
in a basin of attraction Hi the time average value of the equilibrium strategies
σ∗λ
D is equal to state average value of the equilibrium strategies, that is, for all











      
state average
(29)










d(ω )dλi(ω ) (30)


















d(ω )dλi(ω ) for all ω ∈ Ω. (32)
Proof. (1) Part (1) is an immediate consequence of part (4) of Theorem 4, Delbaen’s
Lemma (1974), and the fact that for all basins Hi and all states ω ∈ Hi, L∗(ω,H i)=1 .
(2) Let invariant probability measure λ(·)=
 N































d(ω )dλi(ω ): =w∗

















































Also see Birkhoﬀ’s Ergodic Theorems (pointwise and mean), for example, Theo-
rems 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 in Hernandez-Lerma and Lasserre (2003)).
By part (1) of Theorem 4, each player’s time average value limn p∗(n)w∗
d(ω)=
f∗












d(ω )dλi(ω ) for all ω ∈ Hi.
By part (2) of Theorem 4, for any given invariant probability measure each player’s
average of time averages over the entire state space is equal to his state average over
the entire state space with respect to the given measure.
6 Strategic Stability and Dynamic Consistency in Net-
work and Coalition Formation
Again let σ∗λ
D (·)=( σ∗λ
d (·|·))d∈D be a stationary correlated equilibrium of the dynamic
network-coalition formation game with corresponding equilibrium Markov transition
p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ







be the ﬁnite state space decomposition generated by p∗(·|·) with basins of attraction
{H1,...,H N} and transient set T. Finally, let E∗ = {λi(·)}
N
i=1be the corresponding
set of ergodic probability measures with λi(Hi)=1for all i.
6.1 Strategic Stability and Dynamic Consistency
Each player’s strategy, σ∗λ
d (·|·), is itself a Markov transition - an equilibrium Markov
proposal transition - and governs the way in which player d tries to inﬂuence the
process of network and coalition formation across time. We will refer to the equilib-
rium Markov proposal transitions, (σ∗λ
d (·|·))d∈D, simply as the proposal transitions,
28and we will refer to the induced equilibrium Markov network-coalition transition,
p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)),a st h estate transition.
To begin, let L∗λ
d denote the set of absorbing sets corresponding to player d’s
Markov proposal transition σ∗λ
d (·|·).I f E is an absorbing set for player d under
σ∗λ
d (·|·), then for any status quo network-coalition pair ω =( G,S) ∈ E,i ti so p t i m a l
for player d ∈ S to propose with probability 1 either the status quo or a new network-
coalition pair ω  in E (recall that if d/ ∈ S, then the player is constrained to propose
only that the status quo network be maintained). Thus, if E ∈ L∗λ
d , then for player d,
σ∗λ
d (E|ω)=1for all status quo network-coalition pairs ω ∈ E. If in addition, E is an
absorbing set for all players, that is, if E ∈∩ d∈DL∗λ
d , then for all status quo network-
coalition pair ω ∈ E, it is optimal for all players to propose a network-coalition pair
contained in E with probability 1.
Unless E is of the form {G}×C f o rs o m ef e a s i b l en e t w o r kG ∈ G and some feasible
subcollection of coalitions C ⊆ F, players may not agree on their individual network
proposals, but if E ∈∩ d∈DL∗λ
d then they will at least agree that their proposals
should be drawn from E. Thus, we can think of the sets contained in ∩d∈DL∗λ
d as
being strategically stable. Now suppose that for some strategically stable set E,n a t u r e
too chooses with probability 1 network-coalition pairs from E starting from any status
quo network-coalition pair contained in E; that is, suppose that in addition to being
strategically stable, E is absorbing for the state transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)).W e
can think of these sets as being dynamically consistent. Thus, a set of network-
coalition pairs E is dynamically consistent if E ∈∩ d∈DL∗λ
d ∩ L∗,w h e r ea sb e f o r eL∗
is the collection of absorbing sets corresponding to the state transition p∗(·|·).
We have the following formal deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnitions 5 (Strategic Stability and Dynamic Consistency)
(1) (Strategic Stability)
A set of network-coalition pairs E ∈ B(Ω) is strategically stable if in all states
(G,S) ∈ E each player d ∈ D proposes states in E with probability 1, that is,
if
σ∗λ
d (E|G,S)=1for all (G,S) ∈ E.
(2) (Dynamic Consistency)
A strategically stable set of network-coalition pairs E ∈ B(Ω) is dynamically con-
sistent if in all states (G,S) ∈ E nature chooses states in E with probability 1,
that is, if
p∗(E|G,S)=1for all (G,S) ∈ E.
The following result characterizes dynamic strategic stability and dynamic con-
sistency. The proof is straightforward.
29Theorem 6 (Dynamic Consistency and Invariance)







be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium
Markov transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)).
If E is dynamically consistent, then starting at any network-coalition pair contained
in E, the network-coalition formation process will reach in ﬁnite time with
probability 1 a nonempty subset of network-coalition pairs E ∩ Hi,w h e r eHi is
a basin of attraction and once there will remain there. Moreover, there exists a
p∗-invariant probability measure which assigns positive measure to E ∩ Hi.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tw h i l eE ∩ Hi is absorbing for the state transition
p∗(·|·);t h a ti s ,w h i l eE∩Hi ∈ L∗, E∩Hi is not necessarily absorbing for each player’s
proposal transition σ∗λ
d (·|·); that is, it is not necessarily true that E ∩Hi ∈∩ d∈DL∗λ
d .
Letting E be any dynamically consistent set, note that it is possible for E to
intersect more than one basin of attraction. It is also possible for E to intersect the
transient set - but it is not possible for E to be a subset of the transient set. Let us
suppose then that the dynamically consistent set E intersects basins Hi and Hi ,a n d
consider any p∗-invariant measure λ(·) such that λ(E)=1 . By part (2) of Theorem
4 above we have,
λ(E)=
 N
i   λ(Hi  )λi  (E ∩ Hi  )
= λ(Hi)λi(E ∩ Hi)+λ(Hi )λi (E ∩ Hi ).
Thus, under any p∗-invariant measure λ(·) the measure of any absorbing set E is a
weighted sum of the probability masses the invariant measures λ(·) assigns to each
basin Hi.
6.2 Dynamic Path dominance Core and Dynamic Pairwise Stability
One way to extend the deﬁnition of the path dominance core introduced in Page and
Wooders (2007) to the dynamic setting considered here is as follows:
Deﬁnition 6 (T h eD y n a m i cP a t hD o m i n a n c eC o r e )
An e t w o r kG∗ ∈ G is in the dynamic path dominance core if the set of states
{G∗}×C ∈ B(Ω) is dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C ⊆ F.
We have the following characterization.
30Theorem 7 (The Dynamic Path Dominance Core and Invariance)







be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium
Markov transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)).
If network G∗ ∈ G is in the dynamic path dominance core, that is, if {G∗}×Cis
dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C ⊆ F, then starting at any
network-coalition pair contained in {G∗}×C, the network-coalition formation
process will reach in ﬁnite time with probability 1 a nonempty subset of network-
coalition pairs ({G∗}×C)∩Hi,w h e r eHi is a basin of attraction and once there
will remain there. Moreover, there exists a p∗-invariant probability measure
which assigns positive measure to ({G∗}×C) ∩ Hi.
Note that if for some network G∗ ∈ G and some coalition S∗ ∈ F, {G∗}×{S∗} is
dynamically consistent, then G∗ is in the path dominance core and {G∗}×{S∗} is a
subset of some basin of attraction. However, if there exists a basin of attraction Hi∗
of the form
Hi∗ = {G∗}×{ S∗},
it is not necessarily dynamically consistent - and therefore, G∗ may not be in the dy-
namic path dominance core. Why? Because while nature will choose with probability
1 the network-coalition pair (G∗,S∗) if the status quo is (G∗,S∗),s o m ep l a y e r sm a y
n o td os o( i . e . ,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a t{G∗}×{ S∗} / ∈ L∗λ
d for some player d). This
leads to the following alternative deﬁnition of the dynamic path dominance core.
Deﬁnition 6’ (T h eW e a kD y n a m i cP a t hD o m i n a n c eC o r e )
An e t w o r kG∗ ∈ G is in the weak dynamic path dominance core if the set of
states {G∗}×C∈ B(Ω) is an absorbing set for the state transition p∗(·|·)
f o rs o m es u b s e to fc o a l i t i o n sC ⊆ F.
Under this deﬁnition, for any basin of attraction Hi∗ of the form Hi∗ = {G∗}×
{S∗}, G∗ is in the weak dynamic path dominance core. Moreover, if for some dynam-
ically consistent set E, E ∩ Hi∗ is nonempty but E is disjoint from the other basins,
then starting at any network-coalition pair in E, the process will reach in ﬁnite time
with probability 1 the network-coalition pair (G∗,S∗) and will remain there.
Finally, note that if p∗({G∗}×C| G∗,S)=1for all S ∈ C ⊆ F,t h e nb e c a u s et h e
law of motion
q(·|(G,S),(GDSD))
is absolutely continuous with respect the probability measure μ = ν × γ for all
((G,S),(GD,S D)) ∈ GrΦ(·), G∗ must be an atom of the probability measure ν,t h a t
is,
G∗ ∈ Aν = {Gα1,G α2,...} = {Gαk}
∞
k=1 .
31Moreover, no network G ∈ G\Aν, can be in the dynamic path dominance core.
To extend the deﬁnition of the pairwise stability introduced in Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996) to the dynamic setting considered here, we begin by specializing the fea-
sible set of coalitions to coalitions of size no greater than 2.
Deﬁnition 7 (Dynamic Pairwise Stability)
Suppose the feasible set of coalitions is given by
F2 = {S ∈ P(D):|S| ≤ 2}.
(i.e., all feasible coalitions consist of at most two players). Then a network
G∗ ∈ G is dynamically pathwise stable if the set of states {G∗}×C 2 ∈ B(Ω) is
dynamically consistent for some subset of coalitions C2 ⊆ F2.
We have the following characterization
Theorem 8 (Dynamic Pairwise Stability and Invariance)







be the emergent network-coalition formation process governed by the equilibrium
Markov transition p∗(·|·)=q(·|·,σ∗λ
D (·)).
If network G∗ ∈ G is dynamically pairwise stable, that is, if {G∗}×C2 is dynamically
consistent for some subset of coalitions C2 ⊆ F2, then starting at any network-
coalition pair contained in {G∗}×C 2, the network-coalition formation process
will reach in ﬁnite time with probability 1 a nonempty subset of network-coalition
pairs ({G∗}×C 2) ∩ Hi,w h e r eHi is a basin of attraction and once there will
remain there. Moreover, there exists a p∗-invariant probability measure which
assigns positive measure to ({G∗}×C 2) ∩ Hi.
Our conclusion that for some basin of attraction Hi, ({G∗}×C 2)∩Hi is contained
in the support of some p∗-invariant measure is similar to the conclusion reached
by Jackson and Watts (2002) for a stochastic process of network formation over a
ﬁnite set of linking networks governed by Markov chain generated by myopic players.
They reach their conclusion by considering a sequence of perturbed irreducible and
aperiodic Markov chains (i.e., each with a unique invariant measure) converging to
the original Markov chain. This method is similar to a method introduced into games
by Young (1993) which in turn is based on some very general perturbation methods
found in Freidlin and Wentzell (1984). Here we have reached a similar conclusions
without using perturbation methods.
327 Proof of Theorem 1: The Existence of Stationary Cor-
related Equilibrium
Proof. To begin let V be the set of all μ-equivalence classes of B(Ω)-measurable
functions, v(·):Ω→[−M,M] called value functions. Because Ω is a compact metric
space, the space of μ-equivalence classes of μ-integrable functions, L1(Ω,B(Ω),μ),i s
separable. As a consequence the set of value functions V is a compact, convex, and
metrizable subset of L∞(Ω,B(Ω),μ) for the weak star topology σ(L∞,L1). Letting
Vm =V×···×V       
m:=|D| times
,
Vm equipped with the product topology σm(L∞,L1) is also compact, convex, and
metrizable.
Given status quo state ω ∈ Ω, m-tuple of probability measures σ =( σd) ∈
Πd∈DP (Φd(ω)),a n dm-tuple of value functions v =( vd) ∈ Vm deﬁne




The proof will proceed in 5 steps:





ud(ω,(σd,σ−d))(vd) − maxη∈P(Φd(ω)) ud(ω,(η,σ−d))(vd)
 
,
and consider the correspondence ω → Nv(ω) where
Nv(ω): ={σ : V (ω,σ)(v)=0 }.
Note that σ =( σd) ∈ Nv(ω) if and only if for each player d ∈ D,
ud(ω,(σd,σ−d))(vd) ≥ ud(ω,(η,σ−d))(vd) for all η ∈ P (Φd(ω)).
Thus, ω → Nv(ω) is the Nash correspondence. Given stochastic continuity assump-





is continuous for any vd(·) ∈ V.T h u s ,f o rω ∈ Ω and vd(·) ∈ V
σ → ud(ω,σ)(vd) and σ → V (ω,σ)(v)
are continuous on Πd∈DP (Φd(ω)) w i t hr e s p e c tt ot h ec o m p a c ta n dm e t r i z a b l et o p o l -
ogy of weak convergence of probability measures. Thus, for all ω ∈ Ω and v(·) ∈ Vm,
Nv(ω) is a nonempty, compact subset of Πd∈DP (Φd(ω)) a n db yT h e o r e m6 . 4i n
Himmelberg (1975) Nv(·) is measurable.
33Step 2: Consider the induced payoﬀ correspondence given by
Pv(ω): ={(Ud) ∈ Rm :( Ud)=( ud(ω,σ)(vd)) for some σ ∈ Nv(ω)}.
By Theorem 6.5 in Himmelberg (1975) the payoﬀ correspondence ω → Pv(ω) is
measurable with nonempty, compact values, and by Theorem 9.1 in Himmelberg
(1975) the correspondence
ω → coPv(ω)
is measurable with nonempty, compact convex values.
Step 3: The Nowak-Raghavan Lemma.
Let Σ(coPv(·)) be the set of all μ-equivalence classes of measurable selectors
of ω → coPv(ω), v ∈ Vm. The Nowak-Raghavan Lemma states that the pay-
oﬀ selection correspondence v → Σ(coPv(·)) is upper semicontinuous with non-
empty convex, weakly compact values. Convexity, weak compactness, and non-





denote the graph of the payoﬀ selection correspondence





(U∗(·),v∗(·)). In order to establish that the payoﬀ selection correspondence is up-




,t h a ti s ,w e
must show that U∗(ω) ∈ coPv∗(ω) a.e. [μ].
The proof of this lemma proceeds in three steps:
First,g i v e ns t a t eω ∈ Ω and sequence vn(·) → v∗(·),l e t{σn(ω)}n be a sequence
in Πd∈DP (Φd(ω)) such that σn(ω) ∈ Nvn(ω) for all n. Without loss of generality,
suppose that σn(ω) → σ∗(ω) ∈ Πd∈DP (Φd(ω)) with respect to the topology of weak
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By Delbaen’s Lemma, q(Ω|ω,(ωd)) is continuous in (ωd). Thus, since σn(·|ω) →








so that An → 0.
Next, given that the probability measures q(·|ω,(ωd)) are absolutely continuous























d(ω )dq(ω |ω,(ωd)) := F∗(ω,(ωd)),









so that Bn → 0.
Therefore, we conclude that if vn(·) → v∗(·) and σn(ω) → σ∗(ω), then for all




Second,w eh a v eUn(·) → U∗(·) weakly where for all n, Un(·) ∈ Σ(coPvn(·)), and
vn(·) → v∗(·) weakly where for all n, vn(·) ∈ Vm. By Proposition 1 in Page (1991),





Uk(ω) → U(ω) and U(ω) ∈ coLs{Un(ω)} for all ω ∈ Ω\N.
35Here “co” denotes convex hull and Ls{Un(ω)} is the set of limit point of the sequence
{Un(ω)}n.N o wl e tU∗(·) be a measurable selector of coLs{Un(·)} such that U∗(ω)=
U(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω\N.T h u s ,U∗(ω) ∈ coLs{Un(ω)} for all ω ∈ Ω. By Theorem 8.2





where the Rm-valued functions U∗0(·),U∗1(·),...,U∗m(·) are measurable selectors of
Ls{Un(·)} and the nonnegative functions α∗0(·),α∗1(·),...,α∗m(·) are measurable
with
 m
i=0 α∗i(ω)=1for all ω.T h u s ,f o re a c hi and each ω, Unk(ω) → U∗i(ω) for
some subsequence {Unk(ω)}k.
Third, the proof that the payoﬀ selection correspondence v → Σ(coPv(·)) is upper
semicontinuous, will be complete if we show that U∗i(ω) ∈ coPv∗(ω).T oa c c o m p l i s h
this, we need the following Lemma (*): If Un(ω) → U∗i(ω) where Un(ω) ∈ coPvn(ω)
for all n and vn(·) → v∗(·) weakly, then U∗i(ω) ∈ coPv∗(ω).






where each Uni(ω) ∈ Pvn(ω).T h u s , f o r e a c h n, there exists σni
D(ω) ∈ Nvn(ω) such
that Uni(ω)=( ud(ω,σni
D(ω))(vn

































d)) = U∗i(ω) ∈ coPv∗(ω),




i=0 α∗i(ω)U∗i(ω) ∈ coPv∗(ω),
completing the proof of the Nowak-Raghavan Lemma.
36Step 4: Applying the Kakutani-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem (1952) to v →
Σ(coPv(·)) we obtain an m-tuple of value functions
v(·)=( vd(·)) ∈ Vm
such that
v(ω) ∈ coPv(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω\N where μ(N)=0 .
Let v∗(·)=( v∗
d(·)) ∈ Vm be a measurable selection of coPv(·) such that v∗(ω)=
v(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω\N.T h u s ,v∗(ω) ∈ coPv(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and because coPv(ω)=
coPv∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω,w eh a v ev∗(ω) ∈ coPv∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Step 5: Construct the solution to each player’s dynamic programming problem:




λ∗i(ω)v∗i(ω) for all ω
where for all i =0 ,1,...,m,v∗i(·) ∈ Vm and v∗i(ω) ∈ Pv∗(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.B yt h e
Measurable Implicit Function Theorem (Theorem 7.1 in Himmelberg (1975)), there
exists for each i =0 ,1,...,m, a measurable selection of Nv∗(·), that is, a measurable
function
ω → σ∗i
D(ω) ∈ Πd∈DP (Φd(ω))
with σ∗i
































1−βd. Substituting, we have for all ω ∈ Ω
w∗
d(ω)=rd(ω,σ∗λ










D(ω) ∈ coNw∗(ω) for all ω.
By classical results on discounted dynamic programming (e.g., Blackwell (1965)),














−d)(ω) for all πd ∈ Π∞
d .
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